introduction
In 2012, I analyzed the current debate on the minimum requirements of creativity for a work to be copyrightable. 1 In doing so, I attempted to systematize points made in legal literature and principles followed by various tiers of the judiciary. My reason for resuming such studies has been a series of significant institutional reforms since 2012.
one of them is the emergence of the Court for Intellectual Property rights (russian acronym: SIP), 2 which is authorized to make cassationary reviews of court rulings on intellectual property cases.
Another reform was the abolition of the supreme Arbitrazh Court on August 6, 2014, with its powers handed over to the supreme Court of the russian Federation, which includes a division for economic disputes.
these reforms have seriously changed the mechanism for reviewing court rulings on intellectual property cases in which the litigants were entities or sole traders. so control of judicial practice, including control of its consistency, has been vested in new institutions with different sets of powers. Furthermore, given the polarization of opinions among legal scholars, the appointment of specific persons as judges may seriously affect judicial practice.
It is the purpose of this study to analyze changes that have taken place in the positions of scholars and courts on minimum standards of copyrightability between 2012 and 2016. 
Debates in Legal Literature in Recent Years
since 2012, advocates and opponents of lowering the minimum standards of copyrightability have been engaged in heated debates.
those holding the traditional point of view insisted that the key condition for the protectability of a work should be that it is original and objectively novel (meaning that it should either be different from a work created before or similar to an earlier work that was unknown to all third parties), or even that it should be unique. 3 some scholarly papers formulated an alternative position, arguing that independent creation (subjectively perceived novelty or the absence of deliberate replication) should be a sufficient condition of protectability.
4 two solutions to the problem of parallel creation that this would give rise to were put forward. some scholars believed that, in dealing with two works created independently from each other, copyright should only be granted to the work that was the first to be published (this would have been similar to the application of the novelty criterion and would have not required the use of the criterion for independent creative activity).
5 others believed that exclusive rights should be given to each such work. 6 would have meant a sharp lowering of standards of creativity. It appears that these proposals for lowering protectability standards were reactions to the increasingly prominent economic aspect of intellectual property of insignificant creative value. though those debates were far from over in 2012, and the points made during them needed clarification, the scholarly community has lost interest in the copyrightability standards problem.
It appears that the main reason for this is that judicial practice drastically lowered creativity standards as a protectability condition (I look into this below). 7 In turn, this turned the attention of scholarly literature to the problem of overprotection and monopolization of standard, routine and trivial content that normally belongs in the public domain. It was argued increasingly often that this expansion of the scope of protection seriously limited opportunities for creating new works, sparked copyright conflicts over identical works that were created independently of each other, and resulted in the uncertain legal status of authors of such works since, in the absence of a registration system similar to the system of registration of patents, it would not have been very clear for third parties whether such works of low authorship were protectable. 8 42-58 (2015) ]] (the author cautiously suggests that the application of the novelty, originality and uniqueness criteria may be essential in many cases). detecting public domain content in a work, especially in copyright systems with minimum standards of protectability where this is particularly important. 
Judicial Practice
In this article, I analyze judicial practice for the period from June 2012 to February 2016. the main criterion for selecting court rulings for this study was whether or not they contained a reference to Article 1259 of the Civil Code of russia. our selection also included rulings which made references to Civil Code Articles 1257 and 1258 and contained the terms 'originality' , 'novelty' and 'uniqueness' as key words and used phrases that included any of these terms. the rulings I selected came from the supreme Court, the former supreme Arbitrazh Court, the sIP, district arbitrazh courts, the arbitrazh courts of appeal of the city and region of Moscow, and the Moscow City Court.
Criteria for Copyrightability
standards of creativity for works in russia depend, to a significant extent, on which criteria for protectability are used in judicial practice. the first standard of creativity is the application of the novelty, originality and uniqueness criteria, and the second standard of creativity is the use of the independent creation criterion. the latter is assumed to represent a milder requirement and, therefore, a lower standard of protectability, although, strictly speaking, this is not always the case.
impede the development of other computer programs, forcing other market participants to re-invent the wheel, and may obstruct the standardization of software products, something that clearly runs against the objectives of copyright protection and public interests'); Bogdan ye. semenyuta, Id., at 42-58 ('it needs to be taken into consideration that, without a detailed explanation of the notion of creativity, there will be a major risk that protection is granted to routine solutions that have been achieved through the investment of significant resources, have been attained independently and, strictly speaking, are new but that another person has achieved the same result with a comparable, or even different, amount of resources and by independent work'). the paper suggests that any solutions aiming to enhance functionality should be unprotectable; Гаврилов Э.П. Analysis reveals that, before 2012, judicial practice had, on the one hand, been insensitive to abstract arguments put forward in the course of scholarly debates but had, on the other hand, been forced to react to specific practical problems and contradictions, been evolving balanced positions on key aspects of copyrightability criteria, on creativity standards, and on the distribution of the burden of proof.
despite its contradictory character, judicial practice had mainly and increasingly tended to apply the 'pigeonholing' method, i.e., qualifying a work as protectable if it fitted into any of the copyrightable types of work listed in Clause 1 of Article 1259 of the Civil Code, and, furthermore, tended to use the presumed creativity requirements under Clause 28 of resolution 5/29 10 and the thesis that, per se, the absence of novelty, uniqueness and/or originality cannot be proof that the work is not the product of creative effort and, therefore, unprotectable.
Effectively, this meant the use of the independent creation (non-copying) criterion. however, analysis of judicial practice reveals that 'pigeonholing' was the usual way of dealing with works of high authorship. It was also used for works of insignificant creative value and small elements of works that were likely to be reproductions of public domain content, but relatively seldom
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, and usually when the defendant in a litigation did not dispute the creative character of such a work or element. In difficult disputes over works of low authorship, courts just as frequently departed from Clause 28 of resolution 5/29 and dismissed claims. In some cases of this kind, courts based their dismissal on Clause 5, subclause 4 of Clause 8 and Clause 7 of Article 1259 of the Civil Code.
12 In others, courts directly claimed that a work was neither novel nor original nor unique. these criteria were used by courts of various tiers, including the highest courts.
All this means that, in effect, Clause 28 of resolution 5/29 failed to completely achieve its main objective of lowering copyrightability standards; courts simply saw this clause as authorization not to raise protectability issues in dealing with works of high authorship.
originality, novelty and uniqueness remained the usual criteria in complicated disputes over works of low creative value. our interpretation was that, in the absence of effective means of identifying public domain content, works of high authorship were the only category to which the criterion for independent creation could be applied safely. works or elements of works of relatively low creative value are mainly based on public domain content. unconditionally qualifying such works as copyrightable would have entailed risks of unjustified monopolization of public domain content, or 'overprotection' . resources employed by courts to dismiss claims of protection by authors of such works included the use of high standards of copyrightability and making it the claimant's responsibility to prove that their work meets such standards.
to sum up, the intention to minimize standards of copyrightability came up against a lack of criteria in the russian legal system for identifying public domain content.
13 12 under Cl. 5 of Art. 1259 of the russian Civil Code, ideas, concepts, principles, methods, processes, systems, solutions to technical, organizational and other problems, discoveries, facts and programming languages are not copyrightable. under subcl. 4 of Cl. 6 of Art. 1259, reports on events or facts whose sole purpose is information (e.g., reports on current political events, television program listings in magazines, or train timetables) are not copyrightable either. under Cl. 7 of the same article, part of a work, its title and the description of a character in a literary work are copyrightable if they are accepted as the result of the author's creative work. 13 the public domain is a realm that embraces anything that is part of the general historical or cultural experience of humankind, an element of objective reality or a feature of human relationships, is available from publicly available resources such as nature and universal ideas, and can be reproduced by and expected from any person of average capabilities. this includes, e.g., language, facts, discoveries, generally known or standard images and ideas, and means of artistic expression. For an interpretation of the public domain concept used in this study see, e.g Identification criteria for public domain content must be based on concepts of excessive or insufficient protection, and such concepts must, in turn, be based on the economic analysis of foreseen effects of such protection. For instance, if the objective is to promote science and art, copyright monopoly must not cover technical means used by artists, factual or standard data, or the like. therefore, it was logical to forecast that either the originality, novelty and uniqueness criteria would continue to be applied to works of low authorship or criteria for identifying public domain content would be developed in jurisprudence and through practice.
I have to admit that our forecast has proven to be off the mark.
The activities of the SIP, which exercised the determining influence on the practice of arbitrazh (commercial) courts, aimed to minimize standards of creativity. This trend is comparable to principles of the sweat of the brow doctrine, which was previously used in the American copyright system. 14 detailed court rulings on copyrightability have become much less frequent. this may be due to the sIP consistently repealing rulings that declare works to be unprotectable due to their lack of novelty, originality or uniqueness. this would discourage litigants from making objections to the effect that the lack of novelty, originality and uniqueness makes a work unprotectable.
the dominant trend today is to use the 'pigeonholing' method. According to practically all sIP rulings and to more than 90 percent of rulings of lower courts, it is sufficient to rely on Clause 1 of Article 1295 of the Civil Code to determine whether a work is copyrightable. this applies both to works of high authorship, e.g., works of literature, 15 however, it should be taken into consideration that litigants cannot provide new evidence of copyrightability in the cassationary court. there also are restrictions on the assessment of evidence and the processing of complaints. A court cannot initiate any protectability/unprotectability case -any such case must be based on a suit brought by someone disputing the protectability or unprotectability of the work.
therefore, it can be deduced that the use of the 'pigeonholing' method per se may not necessarily be evidence of the lowering of protectability standards. It may imply that issue of protectability has not been the subject of judicial review and that the work in question was the source of protectability ligitations in lower courts.
however, this appears to be a misinterpretation. Analysis of Articles 286-288, Clause 1 of Article 281.11, Clauses 2 and 3 of Article 291.14, and Clauses 2 and 3 of Article 308.11 of the Arbitrazh Procedure Code and studies of judicial practice make clear that, on the whole, the abovementioned restrictions cannot prevent a cassationary court from initiating a copyrightability case because cassationary courts are authorized to verify whether a lower court has correctly applied and interpreted substantive and other law in dealing with the same case.
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In cases where it is essential to depart from the practice of using the originality and novelty criteria, the sIP directly declares such criteria irrelevant. 26 Protectability litigations in lower courts may, to some extent, provide the basis for interpreting the practice of the use of the 'pigeonholing' method; the fact that the copyrightability of an independently created (non-copied) work is disputed may per se be evidence of higher standards of protectability.
Analysis of sIP practice corroborates this. the issue of proving the protectability of works of high authorship, e.g., works of literature or music, or audiovisual works, and some works of low authorship, primarily computer programs, practically never arises. 27 however, increasingly, sIP rulings on works of low authorship contain references to their authors trying to prove their copyrightability, e.g., references to the distribution of the burden of proof (see below) or to a lower court ruling declaring the work protectable, which implies that the opposite could have been proven. 28 the question is what criteria are used.
Before the sIP was set up, district arbitrazh courts often issued copyrightability rulings. As regards computer programs, it is usually only piracy cases (i.e., unauthorized copying of a program in full, without processing it, and not the separate copying of any of its elements) that are taken to court. In one dispute over a deciphering key, the sIP simply ruled that such a key was part of a copyrightable program and was itself protectable until proven otherwise. therefore, in relation to works of high authorship -and works of low authorship as I demonstrate below -the use of the 'pigeonholing' method in the absence of further debates on copyrightability issues means the use of the criterion for independent creation (non-copying), i.e., the minimum creativity criterion.
Another dominant trend is the direct invoking of the presumption of the creative character of a work (and, consequently, its protectability) as established by Clause 28 of resolution 5/29 and the rejection of the novelty, originality and uniqueness criteria as irrelevant.
29
In view of the above, the issue of the basis on which the creativity presumption can be overridden is fundamental. In previous practice, such presumptions could have been overturned, either by invoking Clause 5, subclause 4 of Clause 6 and Clause 7 of Article 1259 of the Civil Code, which list unprotectable types of work, or by ignoring resolution 5/29, i.e., if a work was found to fail to meet the novelty, originality, and uniqueness criteria. See, e.g., Постановление Федерального арбитражного суда Московского округа от 27 марта 2012 года по делу № А40-133968/09-27-952 [Postanovlenie Federal'nogo arbitrazhnogo suda this was usually the case with works of low authorship, whose protection would have carried the risk of monopolization of public domain content.
the sIP consistently follows Clause 28 of resolution 5/29 in seeking to put an end to this practice and abandon the use of the novelty, originality and uniqueness criteria. the sIP does not only do this in relation to works of high authorship but also, and even more commonly, with works of insignificant creative value, including works that, according to one of the parties to a litigation, are neither novel nor original nor unique, e.g., photographs, 31 works of industrial design, 32 or architectural designs.
33 the sIP has no objection to attempts to prove that works of those types are non-creative but prohibits invoking the novelty, originality and uniqueness criteria for this purpose, though it does not explain in what way non-creativeness can be proven. this effectively makes it impossible for litigants and lower courts to contest the presumption that a work is creative. the sIP's logic suggests that a creativity presumption can be overridden by proving that a work is not an independent creation, in other words, that it is a deliberate replication of another work, or by proving that it is uncopyrightable under Clause 5, subclause 4 of Clause 6 and Clause 7 of Article 1259 of the Civil Code.
however, judicial practice is yet to develop effective principles for dealing with cases in which independent parallel creation of a work is possible in principle, i.e., there is no mechanism for determining whether independent parallel creation or unfair replication has taken place. Insufficient attention to the parallel creation issue is the cause of the contradictory nature of today's practice.
Logically, there should be several ways of dealing with such cases. one way is to qualify a work that is similar to another but is the result of independent and parallel creation as non-unique and, therefore, uncopyrightable. this would mean the use of the uniqueness or originality criterion, and, consequently, relatively high standards of protectability. however, if standards are to be lowered and non-unique works can be qualified as copyrightable, it would seem logical to use one of the following two methods.
one of these is to recognize the rights of the first creator, which would mean the use of the novelty (non-replication) criterion.
the other is to grant rights to both creators if each work was created independently from the other. however, this would require the development of methods to distinguish independent parallel creation from mere copying. 34 the parallel creation issue has almost never been raised in practice. 35 despite its drastic lowering of creativity criteria, the russian law enforcement system effectively disregards the possibility of independent parallel creation of similar works. when two works are identical or similar (or when an element of one work is identical or similar to an element in another work), a court will practically always declare one of them a mere replication of the other and hence a violation of 34 In legal systems that authorize the protection of parallel creation, various intermediary rules, some stricter than others, are used in practice. In germany, for example, such works are granted protection in exceptional situations where the author is assumed to have been unaware, and could not have been expected to be aware, of the existence of the work he has replicated. In all other cases, replication is presumed to have been deliberate. See thomas dreier, gernot schulze, Urheberrechtsgesetz Kommentar exclusive rights. 36 there are very few exceptions -cases where two identical or similar works or elements are declared by court to be unprotectable due to their belonging to the public domain under Clause 5 and subclause 4 of Clause 6 of Article 1259 of the Civil Code 37 (see below for more details). this would suggest that courts do not yet use the independent creation (noncopying) criterion and interpret independent creative activity as creation of a new work.
however, this directly contradicts the above-cited thesis in Clause 28 of resolution 5/29 that the non-novelty of a work cannot per se be proof that it is not the result of creative effort. the russian judiciary avoids the use of the novelty criterion, and the sIP consistently repeals rulings based on it, and, in some cases, grants exclusive rights to a work or elements of it that were widely known before their publication under the claimant's name.
38 such rigid application of Clause 28 effectively results in the granting of exclusive rights to content that was first published under the name of a specific person even if it is not new and was known before. however, it remains unclear how one can prove any such case to be a case of deliberate replication and contest the presumed creative nature of such content. to sum up, analysis of sIP practice prompts the conclusion that this amounts to a model maximally close to the theory of presentation. 39 In other words, practically any content belonging to any of the protectable types ['of work'?] listed in Part 1 of Article 1259 of the Civil Code will be granted protection if it has first been published under the name of a specific author regardless of whether it has or has not been known before or whether use was made in it of any non-unique elements that would have been available for independent creation. one can dispute the exclusive rights of such an author only by proving that they acquired such rights after someone else did. In such a case, the coincidence or similarity of content is a sufficient reason to accuse the defendant of violation of exclusive rights, e.g., of copying the content, where there is no legitimate possibility of parallel independent creation. It is now only possible to dismiss a claim of violation of exclusive rights in the very rare cases when a court finds that uncopyrightable content has been replicated (Clause 5 and subclause 4 of Clause 6 and Clause 7 of Article 1259 of the Civil Code).
saying that this is somewhat like the appropriation of unclaimed property is only a slight exaggeration -one may acquire copyright to practically any content by publishing it under one's own name regardless of whether it is the result of creative work and is novel, original or unique, or whether elements of it are in the public domain. strictly speaking, it is a model that is not based on the independent creation criterion since parallel creation does not come into account at all. Nor can it be said that comprehensive use is made of the criterion for novelty and non-replication as the novelty criterion is in effect only applied when one claims rights to content to which someone else owns rights and is not applied to publicly accessible and replicable content (content that is vorgegeben, to use the german term).
with its low requirements of creativity, the American sweat of the brow doctrine is the system to which the sIP strategy is closest, except that non-acceptance of the possibility of parallel creation and the absence of a methodology for identifying public domain content make the sIP approach even more radical and a potential basis for the monopolization of public domain content because presenting such content as one's own creation is usually enough for the acquisition of exclusive rights to it. 40 this amounts to a classical case of overprotection and the consequent monopolization of public domain content, and puts heavy restrictions on public resources for the creation of new content. 39 on the theory of presentation, a doctrine that one should be granted exclusive rights to any object that one merely claims to be one's own, see, Max kummer, Id., at 75. Peter girth, Individualitat und Zufall im Urheberrecht, 48 uFItA 25-26, 39-41 (1974) . hans-heinrich schmieder, Geistige Schöpfung als Auswahl und Bekenntnis, 52 uFItA 107-114 (1969) . 40 there exist sIP rulings that are directly based on the typical American copyright criterion that, to be protectable, a work needs to be non-borrowed content that is not a replication of something that had been publicly accessible before. It is the general logic behind the model that is currently extensively applied by the sIP, the body whose conduct determines the practice of lower arbitrazh courts. Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to claim that no alternatives to this model are used. First of all, lower arbitrazh courts, which are forced to react to the problem of monopolization of public domain content, still issue rulings based on the originality, uniqueness and novelty criteria, 41 though less frequently than before. Besides, the sIP itself uses these criteria 42 on rare occasions, usually in a bid to prevent the monopolization of public domain content.
these criteria are also used by courts of general jurisdiction, which are outside the jurisdiction of the sIP. Finally, there have been indications that the supreme Court has recently begun to use higher standards of protectability than those used by the sIP. 44 however, one should not overestimate this trend as references to Clause 28 of resolution 5/29 occur in the rulings of top-level courts more often.
Standards of Creativity for Individual Types of Work
there are comparatively few instances in which courts use specific detailed creativity criteria for specific types of work, and so a court usually has to base its conclusions on indirect data such as the character of a work and its possible inclusion of content belonging to the public domain.
Analysis of practice reveals the following trends. First of all, the overall tendency to lower creativity standards as a result of the use of the abovementioned general criteria for protectability remains in place and is gaining momentum. the drastic lowering of copyrightability standards and the increasingly wide-scale rejection of suits based on allegations of use of non-original and non-novel content with references to Clause 28 of resolution 5/29 eliminates any need for setting detailed standards of this kind. For this reason, rulings that directly try to establish minimal standards of copyrightability have become much less frequent.
rulings of this kind are extremely rare and are usually motivated by a desire to avoid the monopolization of content belonging to the public domain. however, on the whole, they represent a contradictory and unsystematic practice.
Courts extremely rarely set special protectability requirements for works of high authorship, primarily works of literature, music, painting and sculpture, and audiovisual works. Normally, there is no need to prove that such works are creative. however, there are instances where higher protectability standards are used for such works. 44 See, e.g., Обзор судебной практики по делам, связанным с разрешением споров о защите интеллектуальных прав. this usually happens if there is a significant non-creative aspect to such a work with a consequent risk of monopolization of public domain content. A literary work cannot be protected if it is just a media article with brief factual information, e.g., a description of a city. 45 one ruling stated that subclause 4 of Clause 6 of Article 1259 of the Civil Code, which prohibits the protection of factual reports, only applies to what is essentially media information and, for that reason, is neither original nor unique, and not the result of creative effort. however, this rule does not extend to creative forms of presenting such information, including presenting it in the form of a compilation, e.g., a collection of indices of revised construction costs. 46 At the same time, a ruling on a similar dispute says that, as there exist numerous organizations that create similar content, the claimant should have proven that their content was original and unique as distinct from content produced by others. A claim that unique calculation methods had been used in compiling indices of revised construction costs was dismissed.
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In a new trend, lower standards of protectability are used for works of low authorship. It happens much less frequently that special requirements of creativity are set for such works, whose creation is based on considerations of functionality, on generally accepted standards of various kinds, on public domain content, or on other factors ruling out creativity. works of this kind are usually a priori considered protectable, and no proof is required of their copyrightability. they are assumed to belong to some of the listed protectable types and presumed to be creative, and the novelty, uniqueness and originally criteria are considered to be irrelevant in dealing with them. there are very rare instances where courts examine suspected monopolization of public domain content -this happens if a defendant provides evidence of this.
As regards works of design, reproducing essential characteristics of such a work (e.g., a font design) is a violation of exclusive rights. 48 hence, the presence of differences is insufficient for a work to be considered an independent creation. on the other hand, use of standard fonts in a work of graphic design cannot be a reason to qualify such a work as non-creative. 49 As I can see, protection is only granted to works of design if they possess distinctive characteristics. A conclusion on whether a disputed design is creative must be based on the examination of individual elements, their mutual arrangement, their distance from one another, etc., but not on the overall similarity or dissimilarity of this design to another. the stylistic similarity of two designs cannot per se be evidence that one of them is not creative. 50 Nor can the confusing similarity of designs be per se evidence of violation of exclusive rights.
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In disputes over works of architecture, urban planning and landscaping, functionality and general standards are factors that come into play much less frequently today. on the one hand, it is not a design documentation as a whole that is granted protection but the design itself (e.g., in an architectural project, the architectural design and the 'architectural part' of the documentation). Neither functional nor technological nor engineering solutions can be copyrightable per se. In a dispute over an architectural design, the architectural solution underlying a disputed design must be compared with the solution underlying the earlier design in order to detect possible unauthorized borrowing, regardless of the character of the existing or planned physical embodiment of either solution. 53 however, architectural solutions are only required to meet comparatively low standards in order for them to be protectable. Coincidences in the 'architectural parts' of documentation on two construction projects are sufficient to qualify one of the architectural designs as a deliberate replication of the other and a violation of exclusive rights. differences and possibilities of parallel creation are not taken into account. 54 In one case, the defendant claimed that they had had no access to the architectural solution that was partially replicated by their own solution and that it was non-unique solutions that coincided. But the court neither verified those claims nor checked whether the coinciding solutions were public domain content (an architectural solution is essentially an idea). this means that a disputable work that is likely to have an insignificant creative aspect receives quite extensive protection with consequent risks of monopolization of public domain content.
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Another trend that remains is that of setting minimal standards of copyrightability for works of cartography.
56 until now, the sIP has denied protection to maps that stated facts purely and simply. only maps that are stylized depictions and are products of creative effort are copyrightable. therefore, the fact that two maps record the same factual data does not represent a violation of exclusive rights. 57 Maps based purely on geodetic data are considered the results of technical work and are not copyrightable. 58 however, in a recent judgment, the supreme Court said that geodetic and cartographic activities may involve both technical work and scientific research, i.e., creative effort. this means that the coordinates systems of the state geodetic Network and maps based on them may be copyrightable. 59 this represents a drastic lowering of creativity standards for cartographic content.
Creativity standards have also been lowered in relation to photographs, with neither the vorgegebenheit ('pre-givenness') factor nor the possibility of independent parallel creation being taken into account. It is the dominant principle that any photograph or video recording is creative work, that the author of a photograph or video recording is to automatically and unconditionally acquire copyright to it regardless of its esthetic value, unless the exclusive rights to it are challenged successfully.
the following operations represent a photographer's creative work: choice of exposure; the spatial positioning of the person or object to be photographed; the photographer's own spatial positioning; the choice of lighting and/or adjustment of the photographer or object of photography to available lighting; the choice of the light filter for the camera lens; setting the shutter speed; aperture control; setting the definition level; film development (for film cameras); and photoshopping (for digital cameras). sophisticated methodology would be developed to detect public domain content in intellectual property. 61 however, neither has happened. In many cases, the rigid application of the creativity presumption under Clause 28 of resolution 5/29 and the thesis of irrelevance of the novelty, uniqueness and originality criteria leave no room for claims that public domain content has been used. 62 one outcome of this practice is the significant reduction in the number of rulings that deny protection to a work for the above reasons, that deal with factors excluding the creative character of a work, and that are attempts to develop protection to a level where there is an optimum balance between monopolized intellectual property and public domain content and there remain guarantees of sufficient resources for third parties to create new works.
Another effect is that the range of content identifiable as belonging to the public domain has narrowed as a result of a methodological revision. For instance, the sIP gives a narrow interpretation of subclause 4 of Clause 6 of Article 1259 of the Civil Code by arguing that it only applies to media reports and does not apply to possible creative characteristics of such reports. there is also the problem of indirect monopolization of public domain content, i.e., situations where some specific content may take only one standard form or a limited number of standard forms, and so protecting such content, which may have been created independently and may even be novel, would limit public opportunities to make use of it.
74 this problem is still not yet clearly formulated in russian judicial practice.
to sum up, the methodology for determining whether particular content belongs to the public domain is thin on the ground, and courts do not have any hard-and-fast guidelines for detecting factors ruling out the creative character of a work. I believe that this, on top of the exclusion of the possibility of parallel creation, often results in overprotection in the form of granting exclusive rights to standard or generally accessible, non-creative content, which, in turn, puts unjustified restrictions on genuinely creative activities. Moreover, it makes the legal status of genuinely creative authors unpredictable as it lays the basis for unintended copyright violations with consequent penalties.
Protection of Minor Works of Art and Literature and of Parts of Works. Scopes of Protection
the protection of minor works of art and literature and of parts of works such as the title of a novel or individual phrases acquires fundamental importance because, on top of the general lowering of creativity criteria, the exclusion of non-creative elements such as art techniques, individual words or set phrases from protectable categories makes it possible to avoid the monopolization of public domain content. A similar problem may arise in disputes over allegedly borrowed content if there are differences between two works and it is alleged that one of them, or part of it, is content that has been borrowed and revised.
In analyzing earlier russian practice, I pointed out that, regardless of whether the author of such allegedly borrowed content was able to prove that they had created that content independently, courts would often deny it protection, arguing that the claimant had failed to prove that the content was the result of their independent creative effort and, therefore, met the novelty, originality or uniqueness criteria. this setting of a relatively high standard of protectability could have prevented the monopolization of public domain content.
the practice of recent years cannot be called either uncontradictory or consistent. Nevertheless, its rigid and unselective lowering of creativity criteria on top of inadequate methodology for detecting public domain content has brought two trends into being. one of them is the lowering of the protectability standards for minor works of art and literature or parts of such works, with no account taken of their possible originality, novelty or uniqueness or, alternatively, of their possible derivative character. the other is a tendency to monopolize generally accessible content, including ideas expressed in a work. this has resulted in works of low 74 In the united states, the chief means of averting such risks is 'merger doctrine ' (see Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9 Cir. 1971) ; Melville Nimmer, david Nimmer, Id., § 13.03 [B] [3]. In germany, the method is the above-described doctrine on the range of an author's resources to create an original work (see Christina Berking, Id., at 75). authorship receiving unjustifiably large scopes of protection, so that a court will quite often find that mere coincidence or similarity between two works represents a violation of copyright and will not even attempt to find out whether the work qualified as an unauthorized replication has involved any independent creative effort or whether the matching or similar content belongs to the public domain.
As regards creativity standards for parts of works, courts of general jurisdiction have normally been more demanding than arbitrazh courts. on the one hand, titles of works of literature and individual phrases that may be used independently are considered creative and original, and hence copyrightable.
75 Separate words are not considered copyrightable. 76 on the other hand, the sIP qualifies titles of literary works as protectable if they cannot be qualified as either borrowed content or publicly accessible content or deliberate replications. 77 special, comparatively high standards are set for characters in works of art and literature. Copyright disputes over characters are some of the sIP's most frequent cases. until recently, minimal creativity standards had been set for characters -they were usually granted protection under Clause 7 of Article 1259 of the Civil Code. however, the supreme Court said in a judgment that a claim for the protection of a character as an element of a work must be based on proof that such a character is an independent result of intellectual effort. For instance, protection may be given to the hero of a novel that possesses a set of characteristics distinguishing him or her from the other characters in it and making him or her original and recognizable. 78 Nevertheless, there is no record of lower courts checking characters for such characteristics. Drawings showing literary characters that are likely to be confused with each other cannot be qualified as violations of exclusive rights. such criterion does not apply here in the sense it is used in trademark disputes. If two drawings are similar but are not identical coherent systems of images, the copyright to the original drawing cannot be considered violated. 80 At the very least, a court would have to find out which specific elements, e.g., the character's image or the theme, had been borrowed and base its qualification on this. 81 As I can see, relatively low creativity standards are set for a newly created character to be protectable (the existence of differences).
Essentially the same principles are used for photographs. the majority of copyright disputes over photographs stem from the replication of photographs. Elements of a photograph cannot be the sources of such disputes, and a photograph is protectable if it is not an exact copy of another. so photographs receive minimal scopes of protection. 82 80 there are more complicated cases where it is impossible to establish whether one photograph is an exact copy of another, for instance, if both were taken from the same position. there have been rulings on such cases where one photograph was qualified as a violation of copyright, which meant a greater degree of protection than protection from exact replication.
83
Protection of elements of works of design is controversial. on the one hand, similarities and coincidences or the copying of elements are not enough for exclusive rights to be declared violated. 84 on the other hand, if an original design has differences from a design whose copyright status is disputed, it is not enough to consider the latter an independent creation. the reproduction of characteristics of the original design in the disputed one may be evidence of violation of exclusive rights 85 but it does not in and of itself preclude the latter design from being protectable. 86 so the degree of originality of designs is supposed to betaken into account in copyright disputes.
however, in recent years an increasingly common practice has been to give large scopes of protection to works or elements of works that were either of insignificant creative value or replicated generally accessible designs or elements, or expressed ideas that were expressed in earlier works. For example, the use of a sentence similar to an earlier sentence in structure, vocabulary and general content has been qualified as a violation of exclusive rights in some cases. 87 Coincidences between elements 83 of architectural solutions are considered sufficient for assertions that a violation of exclusive rights has taken place while differences are ignored and no attempts are made to find out whether the replications represent content that belongs to the public domain and is unprotectable. 88 the understanding of an architectural solution as an idea provides the basis for the monopolization of public domain content since ideas are not usually considered protectable. 89 Works of cartography are another source of controversial practice. on the one hand, similarities between maps due to their recording the same factual data cannot result in copyright violation verdicts. 90 this means that the scope of protection of maps depends on the degree of their originality, with no protection being considered for elements belonging to the public domain. however, there has been a practice of giving protection to coordinates published by the state geodetic Network and to maps based on them, and this makes it possible to monopolize public domain content, and, moreover, give it a large scope of protection. 91 to sum up, the degree of individuality of any content is hardly ever linked to the scope of protection it is given in russian judicial practice. Moreover, there is an obvious trend to give extensive protection to works of low authorship with the result that courts consider similarity between two works to be a sufficient reason for a judgment that a copyright violation has taken place and do not try to find out how much of the replicated work is original or belongs to the public domain or is standard information.
88
De facto, this gives green light to the monopolization of public domain content. In the german system, the protection scope mechanism enshrined in § 24 of UrhG is used for such purposes. See Eugen ulmer, Id. 265 ff. the u.s. system uses similar originality evaluation procedurescontent is qualified as a replication if it has essential similarities to earlier content. see Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 u.s. 340, 361 (1991) . 93 would have to prove either that they had made legal use of the claimant's work or that the latter was non-creative. 94 the burden of proving the creative character of a work is extremely rarely put on its author or their heirs. this only happens when it is suspected that a disputed work is non-creative -either due to established practice, or due to it coming under an unprotectable category, or due to the requirement of proof of protectability (Clause 3, subclause 4 of Clause 6 and Clause 7 of Article 1259 of the Civil Code), 95 or on the strength of specific circumstances and evidence (this involves loose interpretations of the claimant's duty to prove lawful ownership of copyright). 96 however, more and more often, defendants are having to prove the creative character of their work (usually by proving they created it independently) if it contains similarities to parts of the claimant's work. 97 however, these are only occasional situations determined by specific features of cases and do not reflect any stable rules on the placement of the burden of proof.
Nor do there exist any hard-and-fast standards of evidence for the creative or noncreative character of a work. In some cases, courts themselves determine whether 94 a work is creative or whether it contains borrowed elements, 98 while, in others, they either insist that this should be the responsibility of the litigants 99 or seek external expert assessment. 100 In addition, as proof of the creative character of works, courts today accept contracts commissioning such works and documents certifying the authors' fulfillment of their commitments under such contracts. 101 the reason for this is the 98 above-described re-interpretation of copyrightability criteria that attaches more importance to proving a work to be the result of independent effort than to proving its creative character.
Principal conclusions
Minimum standards of creativity for a piece of intellectual property to be copyrightable have been sharply reduced in russian judicial practice in recent years. usually, in order to obtain copyright to a work, its author needs to prove that it belongs to any of the types of work that are copyrightable under russian law and that they have created it by their own efforts (sufficient proof of the latter would be that the work has been published under their name and it is not a copy of a work that has been published under someone else's name). Any work that meets these criteria is considered protectable on the strength of its presumed creative character under Clause 28 of resolution 5/29. It is considered irrelevant to provide any further proof of its novelty, uniqueness or originality.
this makes the russian practice comparable to the principles of the American sweat of the brow doctrine.
however, unlike foreign legal systems that set comparatively low standards of protectability, russian courts have not evolved a mechanism to offset risks of monopolization of public domain content as a result of overprotection, and this is a problem. First of all, there is no practice of granting exclusive rights to a work that is similar to an earlier work but has been created independently. secondly, the practice of refusing protection to non-unique, standard, generally known, and generally available content is disappearing. there exist court rulings granting copyright to the author of content that had been widely known before it was published under their name.
102 thirdly, there is a tendency to give a large scope of protection to works of low authorship with the result that any similarity between two works is considered a case of copyright violation and no attempt is made to find out whether replications are original or standard and generally accessible content. this is the principle that any replication of a protected work or of any of its elements is qualifiable as a violation of copyright. It means that content belonging to the public domain is not identified as such and is not denied copyrightable status in replication disputes. In effect, all this brings judicial practice close to a model where practically any content can be qualified as protectable if it belongs to any of the copyrightable types listed in Part 1 of Article 1259 of the Civil Code and was published under the name of a specific author, regardless of whether it was known before and included non-unique or generally accessible elements.
As a result, exclusive rights are granted to standard or generally accessible content -content that must belong to the public domain, -which puts unjustified restrictions on the creative activities of other authors.
Moreover, it makes legal status of other authors unpredictable as it establishes basis for unintended copyright violations that can be penalized.
the sIP is the chief motivator and vehicle of these changes. sticking to these changes favored by arbitrazh courts rather than courts of general jurisdiction. the supreme Court holds an intermediary position, occasionally applying the originality, novelty, and uniqueness criteria.
